This paper takes advantage of repeated cross-section household surveys and a sharp discontinuity created by the introduction of an unconditional cash transfer to elders. The paper evaluates the impact of these cash transfers on the educational expenditures for children within a household. The analysis finds positive and significant effects of the program at the aggregate level. It also finds that the program has stronger effects in indigenous populations and among female and rural populations. The results are robust with respect to a series of falsification tests, survey structures, model specifications, and estimation methods.
Introduction
Even though conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have been quite successful in helping achieve development goals, there has been recent debate on the merits of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) in relation to conditional ones. It is unclear whether CCTs are a strongly dominating strategy, as UCTs may provide equal or even superior results in some cases. In fact, UCTs have been found to reduce child labor, increase schooling, and improve health and nutrition (Baird et al., 2011) . Given that from a policy perspective they are administratively easier to implement and are less costly than CCTs, a clear identi cation of the key characteristics associated with the successful implementation of UCTs is relevant. There are some indications along these lines that are provided by Burlando (2014) and Agüero et al. (2005) , who found that attaching conditions to transfers may be super uous providing that a clear alignment of incentives occurs.
In this paper, we study the causal impact of UCTs on intra-household allocation in a context in which, given an alignment of incentives, conditions may not be needed. The speci c UCT that we explore arises from an exogenous policy change implemented by the government of Bolivia, by which elderly adults are to be provided with a permanent unconditional transfer of cash. Similar to most developing countries, elderly adults are among the most vulnerable groups in Bolivia, typically due to liquidity constraints that surge from inadequate pension systems and high levels of informality.
For the purposes of our research, we focus on the case of extended households where children and grandparents live together in the same residence, something not unusual in many developing countries. It is reasonable to expect that elders living with their grandchildren in the same household will develop stronger bonds and become more invested in the welfare of the children, particularly with respect to human capital investments, such as education and health, which reinforces an alignment of incentives among members of the household.
As in most overlapping generation models, an intergenerational transmission of wealth from older generations to younger generations is expected to occur given the alignment of incentives of the older generations with respect to the expectations of welfare improvement of younger generations. In the context of a standard rational expectations approach, this may translate to an increased incentive for the intra-household reallocation of funds from the older generation to the younger in the short term, even when the older generation is facing budget constraints (Barro, 2004; Azariadis, 1993) .
Interestingly, this idea has rarely been tested. Will the older generations provide for the younger ones in the short term when they are still alive and under constraints? If so, will they do so unconditionally, given the alignment of incentives?
There is limited empirical evidence for the e ects of old-age cash transfers and even less on the impact of old-age cash transfers on intra-household investment allocation. As mentioned, the e ect of old-age transfers on intra-household investment allocation is of particular interest given the increasing use of these transfers in developing countries, the number of bene ciaries that live within family households and the potential dependence on the transfers in poorer households. Some related studies include Du o (2003) and Edmonds (2006) , who examine the South African old-age pension program and nd evidence that the redistributive consequences of the transfer of food, clothing, and housing are better conditions for households with children. In Latin America, there is some evidence that transfers have reduced poverty (Joubert and Todd, 2011; Barrientos, 2003) as well as evidence regarding intra-household behaviors among households in Chile and Mexico that receiving transfers deviates expenditures towards human capital investments, particularly health (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2015; Behrman, 2011) .
The implementation of an old-age UCT program in Bolivia (Bolivida) provides an excellent opportunity to study the causal e ects of UCTs on intra-household income allocation towards children's human capital investments, particularly that of education, for which there is, along with health, limited evidence. This program, rst implemented at the end of 2000, has been the core of old-age population support strategies in the country. However, its impacts, if any, are still grossly understudied. We take advantage of the fact that the probability of receiving this transfer changes discontinuously at the age of eligibility and use this sharp discontinuity to parametrically identify conditional average intent-to-treat e ects and study intra-household income allocation patterns with emphasis on education investments. We measure the impact of this program through child-level educational expenditures, along with old-age program eligibility, after controlling for socioeconomic and demo-graphic characteristics. The eligibility e ect, which we allow to vary across households and children, is assumed to be a log linear function of the ethnicity and gender of the potential recipient. In addition, given the high diversity in the country and the predominance of indigenous populations, we also estimate a series of heterogeneous estimates. Our main nding is that unconditional cash transfers to elders lead to substantial improvements in children's educational investments. We nd that unconditional transfers increased such investments by approximately 60 percent. With respect to ethnicity, eligibility leads to greater increases in schooling investments among indigenous households compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. We nd a similar result for rural and female students.
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Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie y describes the old-age unconditional cash transfer program and its basic characteristics. Section 3 presents the data and basic statistics. Section 4 describes the methodological approach, and Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 then presents robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Brief Description of UCT Program for Elders
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America, as illustrated by the fact that approximately twothirds of the households are below the poverty line (The World Bank, 2016) . Traditionally, the elderly and the youngest have been the most vulnerable and unprotected segments of the population. In fact, whereas 35 percent of adults live in poverty, nearly 55 percent of children and 60 percent of the elderly do so (The World Bank, 2016) , and it is this latter group that is the most unprotected and vulnerable.
Moreover, coverage in Bolivia is one of the lowest in the region, with approximately 80 percent of the population having no access to any type of pension system (Landa and Yanez-Pagans, 2008) . In addition, the country has a rather complex multiethnic dimension re ected in the fact that it has the 1 Only a handful of studies have examined e ects of this unconditional cash transfer. They have focused on impacts on poverty (Escobar-Loza et al., 2013) , household expenditures (Martinez, 2004) , co-habitation (Valencia, 2011), health, labor and unintended impacts (Hernani-Limarino and Mena, 2015) . The latter provides some basic evidence on education, but exploits a di erent exogenous shock for di erent years. In particular, they take advantage of a reduction in the age of eligibility from 65 to 60 years in 2007.
highest percentage of indigenous populations in Latin America, with almost 50 percent of Bolivians self-reporting as belonging to an indigenous group.
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As part of the structural reforms of the 1990s that were broadly supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government created an old-age unconditional cash transfer program that entitled all Bolivians aged 65 and older to receive a at, noncontributory, unconditional cash transfer independent of their income levels. In short, the only eligibility rule was age 3 .
The government determined that this pension would be nanced with the dividends of the shares of privatized companies as part of the structural reform e ort. Whereas the original program, known as Bonosol (Bono Solidario), was rst introduced in 1997, liquidity problems were so serious that in 1998, it had to be put on hold, and when it resumed, at the end of 2000, it was renamed Bolivida, and the pension was reduced from annuities of US$248 to US$60. Figure 1 presents estimates by beneciaries. Though take-up is high at the margin of eligibility, compliance is not perfect. Whereas 80 percent of the individuals over 65 receive the bene t, the share is slightly lower as one approaches the cuto , a situation that is mainly driven by the indigenous male population in rural areas. Low take-up rates are somewhat unsurprising given that, in rural areas, there are signi cant de ciencies in personal identi cation systems and there are few nancial centers, a situation that tends to disproportionately a ect the indigenous population 4 . Under the reasonable assumption that, on average, age is truthfully reported and that it is measured with little error, it is reassuring to observe that very few elders who are ineligible to bene t from this program are cashing out of Bolivida.
Data
We To identify the e ects of the unconditional cash transfer on expenditures in education, we build a variable that captures expenditures on education for each school age child as our key unit of analysis.
Expenditures on education include education enrollment tuition and fees, uniforms, school materials, other school fees and contributions, transportation related expenditures and individual expenses for each student 10 . This measure captures heterogeneity across di erent age cohorts, as expenditures may di er across educational levels, and intra-household human capital investment decisions may vary at di erent stages of life. Therefore, to evaluate the impact on education investment, our unit of analysis is children between 6 and 18 years old 11 . Accordingly, we analyze the combined impact on the decision to invest, if the children have matriculated, and the amount spent.
In terms of treatment assignment, we identify the treatment status of a household based on the age of the household member closest to the cut-o age of 65 years. If the household member closest to the cut-o age is younger than 65, the household is considered untreated, and if the member is 65 years old or older, the household is considered treated. For example, a household with two senior people, one who is 64 and one who is 80, is considered untreated, while a household with two senior persons, one who is 65 and one who is 80, is considered treated. In this sense, the results can be interpreted as the impact of having one additional recipient member, and we can more clearly identify the impact of receiving the cash transfer on the allocation of expenditures within the household. Thus, we consider as treated those children who live in a treated household and consider as untreated those children living in an untreated household.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 displays a histogram of individuals at age 50 and above that compares before and after the implementation of Bolivida, which occurred at the end of 2000. There is no evidence of a sudden increase in the population distribution at the age of the threshold of eligibility. Panel (b) in the same gure indicates that there is no change in the share of households that are eligible around the cut-o age. In addition, the conditional probability of being eligible increases at such a 10 For additional details see the household questionnaire for the 2001 Household survey, section 9 part E: Education expenditures. We exclude from the calculations expenditures on photocopies due to inconsistent information reported and outliers in the sample.
11 Additional estimations using household per-student educational expenditure as well as including children in school but without expenditures were performed and the results remain robust.
value, indicating a signi cant discontinuity with respect to actual bene ciaries. As it is reasonable to believe that age cannot be manipulated, especially since bene ciaries are required to provide legal documents to authorities to participate, households are unlikely to strategically locate themselves around the age of eligibility. Thus, we can con dently assert that the main assumption behind our regression discontinuity design holds, and therefore, we use it to identify the average UCT intentionto-treat e ects on children's schooling expenditures (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) 12 . It is noted that we do not estimate the average treatment e ect on the treated as the use of the bene ciary variable in this setup is problematic since the receipt of a pension may be endogenous given that we nd slight di erences between actual and estimated bene ciaries. As previously mentioned, these di erences may arise because of de ciencies in the government's personal identi cation documentation system, because of a lack of available funds to cover the fully targeted population, or because of di culties reaching nancial centers, either due to the lack of transportation or the excessive distance. All these factors may constrain eligible members from receiving bene ts 13 . 
Empirical Strategy
The aim of this paper is to analyze the causal e ect of the potential unconditional cash transfer received by elders on the education expenditures of children who live in the same household, when 12 The density of age around the cut-o appears symmetric, which supports the validity of the assumption. 13 As the exact constraining mechanisms are unclear, we decided that our empirical exercises should focus mainly on potential bene ciaries. taking advantage of the exogenous implementation of the Bolivida program of 2001, which is related to the income shock that families with an elder member may have experienced. Based on the characteristics of the program, a possible strategy may be to adopt a di erences-in-di erences approach, comparing education expenditures per child as a function of the age of eligibility of the reference household member and the variable indicating whether Bolivida was already implemented. However, a simple comparison of education expenditures by households below or above the cut-o age across time is likely to provide a biased estimate. Since the cut-o age coincides with the retirement age, the household structure and distribution of potential retirees may not be random, and thus, the presence of elder household members may have an impact on the allocation of time and resources among household members. Therefore, it may be possible that potential bene ciary households will di er systematically from non-bene ciary households. In this case, a simple di erence-in-di erence model would not be valid to account for the potential systematic di erences.
To overcome unobserved di erences between potential bene ciary and non-bene ciary households, we exploit the fact that the probability that an individual receiving the cash transfer changes discontinuously at the age of eligibility. Accordingly, we apply a straightforward regression discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . Furthermore, since we also have information across time, namely, individual information before and after the implementation of the program, an additional approach that we apply is a combination of a di erences-in-di erences approach and a sharp regression discontinuity design. This speci cation is written as follows:
where the log of per child education expenditure is estimated as a function of the age of eligibility (I age65 ) of the reference person in the household, an indicator of the year when the transfer was implemented (I yr≥01 ) and an interaction of both age of eligibility and year of implementation. In addition, we allow for the inclusion of exible functional forms of the gap between the reference person's age and the cut-o age (age ref -64.5), both of which can vary before and after the year of implementation (f γ ,f l ,g γ ,g l ), and for households with a reference individual's age above or below the cut-o age. In this speci cation, a 3 is the parameter of interest as it identi es the impact of the unconditional cash transfer for school age children living in households where the reference person is near the cut-o age 14 .
Since the treatment state of a household is based on the age of the person closest to the cuto age or the reference individual, it is possible that there may be other elderly individuals living in the household. Given that their presence is also likely to in uence household expenditures on children possibly due to income shocks, our baseline speci cation includes a control for the presence of any household member older than 65, other than the reference person. In the context of the regression discontinuity approach, two additional factors are considered, (i) the functional form for the age gap (f γ ,f l ,g γ ,g l ) and (ii) the bandwidth selection. With respect to the choice of the functional form, we consider that the forcing variable, the age of the reference individual, is discreet, and thus, the use of non-parametric regressions is not viable. Instead, we estimate the empirical speci cations using di erent polynomial functions, including logistic, linear, quadratic, and cubic functional forms.
Due to the restricted variation in the forcing variable, we do not estimate higher-order polynomials, which helps us avoid over-speci cation. The selection of the order polynomial is based on the Akaike information criteria (AIC) as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) .
The second key issue is the choice of an appropriate bandwidth selection, as it determines the nal sample employed in the analysis. While larger bandwidths allow for the use of more data and, thus, potentially help obtain more precise estimates, they can also reduce the accuracy of the estimates if the model is misspeci ed, which may introduce bias on the estimated treatment e ects. To address this issue, we apply a cross-validation strategy, as described by Lee and Lemieux (2010) , to select the appropriate bandwidth. Based on the cross-validation strategy and the AIC applied to the baseline model, we choose a linear model with a bandwidth of nine years above and below the cut-o age.
Results
We depart from testing competing models to obtain an initial estimate as well as establish the best speci cation for our estimation. As evidenced in Figure 5 , and following the existing literature of Lee and Lemieux (2010), we test quadratic, cubic, log linear and linear speci cations. For most speci cations, the average e ect is below one. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) and the Akaike criteria, these ndings indicate that the preferred empirical speci cation should be the linear speci cation. Table 2 reports the basic results of our preferred speci cation without any controls. Column one shows that, on average, the implementation of the cash transfer increased expenditures on education by approximately 73 percent in Bolivia. In addition, our results show that the probability of moving from a zero expenditure on education to a positive size is approximately 12 percent and, for those households that have some level of expenditure, the e ect of the cash transfer reaches approximately 43 percent and remains statistically signi cant at conventional levels. These results indicate that unconditional cash transfer to elders in uences intra-household behavior by promoting larger expenditures on education. Moreover, these e ects are larger in those households that are already contributing to their children's education. However, these results may be biased as we are not controlling for other factors that may a ect education expenditures. Table 3 presents the ndings when we include a broad set of controls, speci cally, age, gender, number of children in the household, number of children aged ve or under, number of adults, presence of a parent in the household, parents' education, urban or rural area, and indigenous or nonindigenous background. For the most part, we nd analogous results and stronger impacts. However, it is interesting to note that when controlling for an indigenous background and an urban setting, the impact observed is reduced by approximately ten percentage points with respect to the speci cation without such controls. These somehow suggest that additional heterogeneity analyses can provide further insights into the results presented herein. For instance, full sample estimates may hide some heterogeneity due to cultural and geographical factors, and, more particularly, ethnicity, a highly relevant element in a country such as Bolivia.
The identi cation of indigenous people in Bolivia is not straightforward as social class and ethnic elements are interrelated and di cult to disentangle, and, in general, the information used to de ne who the indigenous people are is based on a set of ethnolinguistic characteristics.
We use three speci c questions from our survey data aimed at identifying ethnic groups: (i) do you consider yourself as belonging to an indigenous group? (ii) what languages do you speak? and,
(iii) what language did you rst learn to speak? The rst two questions are intended exclusively for household members who are at least 12-years-old, and the third is intended for all members in the household. We follow Molina and Albó (2006) , who employ the above three criteria to construct an ethnolinguistic matrix for Bolivia. We classify as non-indigenous those who do not self-identify as indigenous, whose rst language was not indigenous, and who did not learn an indigenous language as children. We de ne as indigenous those who identify themselves as indigenous, whose rst language was indigenous and those who learned an indigenous language as children. To simplify our empirical approach, all other combinations are labeled as multiethnic. results that lie somewhere between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations. These results may be because indigenous populations tend to face credit constraints, and therefore, any liquidity shock modi es signi cantly the allocation of expenditures within households. A similar nding is noted when comparing rural and urban groups. While in the former we nd a large and statistically signi cant impact, urban populations exhibit smaller and non-signi cant e ects. In addition, we es-timate the average e ects of eligibility for girls and boys separately 15 . The coe cients are reported in column (4) of Table 4 . We nd that conditional on eligibility, human capital expenditures on girls almost doubles and is strongly statistically signi cant, while for boys, this result is approximately 22 percent and not statistically signi cant at any standard levels. This nding is reassuring since females have been historically neglected in schools in Bolivia.
In Table 5 , we further explore the role played by gender in the intra-household allocation from elders to children. Speci cally, we explore the a nity between the gender of grandparents and grandchildren as well as the impact of the age of the children on grandparents' preferences. We nd evidence that educational expenditures on girls are driven by grandfathers, but not by grandmothers, as revealed in Panel (a). This is rather remarkable, as it indicates that male elders, having bene tted from a system that favors males, realize the di culties that females have in Bolivia. Moreover, it is fully consistent with our previous ndings. Furthermore, we nd that grandfathers focus their attention on girls between the ages 13 and 18 years, unlike grandmothers, who appear to focus on younger children. This is presented in Panel (b) in Table 5 .
Robustness
We observe that there is a small share of the population that may be receiving the unconditional cash transfer despite being younger than the corresponding cut-o age of 65 and that the share of people who are not receiving the bene t may be greater for those closer to the cut-o 16 . This may raise questions about the strength of using 65 years of age as the cut-o point and about the relevance of the bandwidth. To test for this, we perform a series of falsi cation tests, the results of which are displayed in Table 6 . We test alternative cut-o ages ranging from 63 to 67 years of age and control for analogous covariates as in our main results. We do not nd any statistically signi cant results at conventional levels.
15 Child ethnicity sub-samples cannot be tested since not all variables used in the classi cation of ethnic groups were collected for children under the age of 12. 16 We observe this graphically. The corresponding gure is available upon request.
Similarly, Table 7 presents the results using di erent bandwidth and alternative empirical specications that control for all the covariates as in Table 6 . A major concern with the regression discontinuity design is the high sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of bandwidth, and thus, although moving the bandwidth slightly a ects the results, they remain stable and statistically signi cant for our preferred model, the linear speci cation. The quadratic and cubic models provide similar estimated treatment e ects, albeit smaller for the quadratic and larger for cubic. However, for the quadratic speci cation, it is only signi cant when using h = 10, and it is not statistically signi cant in the cubic case
As an additional robustness test, Table 8 reports ndings that are not estimated using a regression discontinuity design along with a di erences-in-di erences approach but rather are estimated using a combination of RDD and a before-after design (Hoddinott and Skou as, 2004; Borooah and Iyer, 2005) . That is, these results are estimated separately for the period before and the period after the Bolivida UCT, and conditional means are then compared to assess the impact of the program. This speci cation is more exible than the pooled one previously employed, but it reduces the degrees of freedom as it requires that more parameters be estimated. Although the results are somewhat smaller, they are equally statistically signi cant.
Finally, the Appendix (Table 9 ) presents the results when using weights provided by the National Statistics Institute. If anything, the results tend to be more robust and slightly greater than, albeit not signi cantly di erent from, our base results 17 .
Conclusions
In this research, we take advantage of repeated cross-section household surveys and a sharp discontinuity created by the introduction of an unconditional cash transfer to elders to evaluate the 17 The household survey data collection process employs a two-stage sampling strategy. First, primary sampling units are chosen, and then, households are selected randomly. This may call for the use of weighting schemes, which are estimated by the National Statistical O ce. Since our speci cation is based on a pooled cross-section, a di -in-di approach may yield biased estimates. This is because the sampling frame for the baseline surveys (1999 and 2000) was constructed based on the 1992 census enumeration list while the follow up surveys (2001 and 2002) used an updated sampling frame that was constructed upon revised cartographic information compiled for the 2001 census. intent-to-treat impact on the educational expenditures related to children within a household by using a regression discontinuity design and a di erences-in-di erences approach. The eligibility e ect, which we allow to vary across households and children, is assumed to be a linear function of the ethnicity and gender of the potential recipient. The main nding is that unconditional cash transfers to elders lead to substantial improvements in children's human capital investments. We also nd that the program has stronger e ects in indigenous populations as well as in female and rural populations. Our results are robust to a series of falsi cation tests, survey structures, model speci cations and estimation methods. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
